The literature on politics in accounting regulation describes regulatory capture and ideology as primary political forces. We combine theory on populism and the legitimacy of the IASB and predict that, in global accounting regulation, populism and its host ideologies are associated with politicians’ voting and debating on technical accounting issues. We analyze IFRS-related votes and debates in the EU parliament and find that populists, in general, are more likely to speak in debates, vote and argue against policies supporting the IASB and IFRS, and use rhetoric consistent with populism theory. Moreover, we find that left and right populists mostly use arguments consistent with their host ideologies, thus reaching the same conclusion based on distinct reasoning. Our findings are important because left and right populists’ criticism suggests different alternatives for an accounting regulation regime. We find evidence consistent with the causes of populism, such as voters’ exposure to globalization, fiscal austerity, or income inequality amplifying populists’ voting and debating behavior, and discuss to what extent global reporting regulation is vulnerable to the rise in populism.

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